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Fixing Incontestability: The Next Frontier? 
Rebecca Tushnet
1
 
 
Incontestability is a nearly unique feature of American trademark law, with a unique 
American implementation.
2
  The concept of incontestability allows a trademark registrant to 
overcome arguments that a symbol is merely descriptive of features or qualities of the 
registrant’s goods or services—for example, “Juicy” for apples.  Without incontestability, to 
claim trademark protection, a user of a descriptive symbol has to show that consumers have 
come to recognize that symbol as indicating the source of the relevant goods or services—for 
example, “American Airlines” for airline services.3  This recognition is known as “secondary 
meaning.”4  Although courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) can accept 
                                                 
1
 Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  Thanks to Mark Lemley, Mark McKenna, Lisa Ramsey, 
Alexandra Roberts and Marty Schwimmer for comments, and to my research assistant Jason Goldfarb. 
2
 Canada has its own version of incontestability, with much more limited benefits.  Five years after the date of 
registration in Canada, no trademark registration can be invalidated on the ground that a third party used a 
confusingly similar mark before the registrant registered the mark, unless the registrant knew of the third party’s use. 
Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 17 (Can.); see also Diane M. Lambillotte & Timothy Lo, Incontestability 
of Marks in the United States and Canada: A Comparison of Perspectives and Purposes, INTA BULLETIN (Aug. 15, 
2014), 
http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/IncontestabilityofMarksintheUnitedStatesandCanadaAComparisonofPersp
ectivesandPurposes.aspx [https://perma.cc/J64K-S5VZ]. In general, European law does not have incontestability.  
Anne H. Hocking & Anne Desmousseaux, Why Louboutin Matters: What Red Soles Teach Us About the Strategy of 
Trade Dress Protection, 105 TRADEMARK REP. 1337, 1368 (2015) (“Europe does not have incontestability 
proceedings; distinction of the trademark is not recognized through registration alone in Europe.”).  In Spain, 
cancellation on relative grounds (relating to the rights of other parties) can only occur within five years of 
registration, unless the registrant acted in bad faith, but the absolute ground of lack of distinctiveness does not have 
this limit. 32/1988, of November 10, 1998 on Trademarks, at § 48(2) (Spain), WIPO Database of Intellectual 
Property, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=126581 [https://perma.cc/ZM4G-M3GY].  German law 
protects marks from cancellation on grounds of mere descriptiveness, lack of distinctiveness, or genericity once they 
have been registered for ten years, though it’s unclear that this provision is compatible with the supposed 
harmonization of trademark law within the EU. 1 EDWARD FENNESSY & ANDRÉ POHLMANN, TRADEMARKS 
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 60:23 (2016) [hereinafter FENNESSY & POHLMANN]; see also Peter Wilner, The Madrid 
Protocol: Balancing Sovereignty and Efficiency, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 871, 891 (2002) (“[A] mark 
never becomes incontestable [in Germany].”) (citing ETHAN HORWITZ, WORLD TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE at 
Germany § 4.03 (Matthew Bender ed., 2nd ed., 2002)).  In other regimes, the idea of “acquiescence” may also 
protect some registrations from cancellation based on likely confusion with senior marks. See, e.g., FENNESSY & 
POHLMANN, supra (explaining acquiescence in German law); Industrial Property Code (approved by Decree-Law 
No. 16/95 of January 24, 1995) at art. 214(5) (Portugal), WIPO Database of Intellectual Property, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=129395 [https://perma.cc/QW9F-VNYY] (providing that third 
parties must bring a cancellation action within ten years of registration to avoid “prejudice” to their rights); 1 ETHAN 
HORWITZ, HORWITZ ON WORLD TRADEMARK LAW FRA § 4.03 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2016) (explaining that, in 
France, a third party claiming infringement or a breach of a duty not to register must act within three years after 
publication). Nonetheless, statutory incontestability is an outlier. 
3
 15 U.S.C.S. § 1052(f) (2006). 
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circumstantial evidence as proof of secondary meaning, proving it can be uncertain and 
expensive.
5
  Incontestability avoids the potentially difficult problem of showing secondary 
meaning and replaces it with a statutory mandate to proceed as if secondary meaning existed, no 
matter what evidence to the contrary the opposing party musters.
6
   
This irrebuttable presumption of trademark meaning is a powerful protection, given that 
descriptive terms lacking secondary meaning are otherwise free for all competitors to use and 
that competitors are likely to have good reasons to do so—after all, the symbol describes relevant 
features of the product or service.  Although competitors retain the defense of descriptive fair 
use, this defense can be burdensome to prove and often requires at least extensive discovery.
7
 
Descriptive fair use is also of no use to a competitor who wants to use a descriptive term as part 
of its own trademark,
8
 as many desire to do.
9
 
Given the power of incontestability, one might think it would be carefully granted.  
Unfortunately, claims of incontestability (known as Section 15 filings or Section 15 affidavits) 
are not subject to substantive examination at the PTO.
10
  Worse, and of particular relevance to 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) (Eschbach, J., concurring) 
(“[S]urvey evidence in trademark and trade dress cases can be very costly.”); Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch + Lowy, 
No. 90-4464, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19123, at *58 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that the 1990 cost of conducting a 
proper consumer survey in a trademark dispute could reach $65,000); Robert C. Bird, The Impact of the Moseley 
Decision on Trademark Dilution Law, 26 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 102, 104 (2007) (noting that surveys can cost 
as much as $100,000 to administer); Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 
2099, 2130 (2004) (“If judicial determinations of secondary meaning were always accurate and if secondary 
meaning could be proven without cost, it would make sense to put parties to their proof in all cases. But courts do 
make mistakes, and proof of secondary meaning is expensive.”); Julie P. Tsai, Fashioning Protection: A Note on the 
Protection of Fashion Designs in the United States, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 447, 453 (2005) (“The evidentiary 
requirement to prove secondary meaning tends to be rigorous and expensive to establish.”); 2 MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §15:28 (4th ed.) (“It is impossible to lay down any generalized rule as to 
the minimum amount of distinctiveness necessary to achieve secondary meaning in a mark.”). 
6
 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b) (2002); 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:141 (4th ed.) 
(2017). 
7
 See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth 
multiple factors to consider and concluding that summary judgment shouldn’t be granted based on descriptive fair 
use defense); Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 95 F. Supp. 3d 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. 
Kelly–Brown v. Winfrey, 659 F. App’x 55 (2d Cir. 2016). 
8
 See, e.g., Galvotec Alloys, Inc. v. Gaus Anodes Int'l, LLC, No. 7:13–CV–664, 2014 WL 6805458, at *12 
(S.D.Tex. Dec. 2, 2014) (“[T]he defense ‘allows [the defendant] to use a term in good faith to describe its goods or 
services, but only in actions involving descriptive terms and only when the term is used in its descriptive sense 
rather than in its trademark sense.’”) (citations omitted). 
9
 See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L. J. 759, 771 (1990) (citing marketing literature). 
10
 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:140 (4th ed.) (“The [PTO] does not examine the 
merits of a[n incontestability] affidavit. If the affidavit is received at a proper time, it is entered in the [PTO’s] 
records without regard to its substantive sufficiency, although it is inspected for facial inconsistencies or 
omissions.”); TMEP §1605 (8th ed. Jan. 2017) (“When a §15 affidavit or declaration complies with the requirements 
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this Symposium, courts may misunderstand either the prerequisites for, or the meaning of 
incontestability, allowing trademark claimants to assert rights that they don’t actually have.11  
Courts even appear to be inconsistent about meeting their statutory duty under 15 U.S.C. §1116 
to notify the PTO about the filing and conclusion of all actions implicating registered 
trademarks, which has implications both for validity in general and for incontestability in 
particular.
12
  Competitors, many of them likely to have little in the way of sophisticated 
trademark advice, are in an even worse position to evaluate the validity of incontestability.
13
 
What can be done?  The PTO’s recent changes to Section 8 renewal procedures, 
attempting to make clearer the requirements for actual use of trademarks for registration 
renewals to keep “deadwood” off the register and making random audits a permanent part of the 
process, offer a good starting point.
14
  Incontestability, like basic registration maintenance 
procedures, needs clearer signals about what it is and when it is available.  In the absence of 
serious substantive examination of incontestability at the PTO—which seems unlikely to 
materialize any time soon—changes designed to increase the salience of incontestability’s 
requirements to filers and to courts could provide some protection against wrongful assertions.  
If we are to have incontestability at all, it should do something consistently and well to serve the 
interests of the trademark registration system. 
I. The Problem 
A. What Is Incontestability and Why Should We Care? 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the statute and rules, the USPTO updates its records to acknowledge receipt of the affidavit or declaration and 
sends a notice of acknowledgment to the owner of the registration.  Acknowledging receipt of the affidavit or 
declaration provides notice to the public that an affidavit or declaration of incontestability has been filed; it is not a 
determination by the USPTO that the registration is in fact incontestable.  The question of whether the registration is 
incontestable arises and is determined by a court if there is a proceeding involving the mark.”). 
11
 See Part I, infra. 
12
 See Part II, infra. 
13
 See Peter S. Sloane & Laura J. Winston, Incontestability: Does Anybody Really Understand It?, INTA Bulletin, 
Aug. 1, 2009, http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/IncontestabilityDoesAnybodyReallyUnderstandIt.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/LXM4-FMRS]. 
14
 Dep’t of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, 37 CFR Parts 2 and 7 [Docket No. PTO–T–2016–0002] RIN 
0651–AD07, Changes in Requirements for Affidavits or Declarations of Use, Continued Use, or Excusable Nonuse 
in Trademark Cases, Jan. 19, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-19/pdf/2017-00317.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5X2T-KBFP]. At the time of this writing, the new administration has included these changes in its 
regulatory hold.  They are now scheduled to go into effect March 21, 2017.  See Dep’t of Commerce, Patent and 
Trademark Office, 37 CFR Parts 2 and 7 [Docket No. PTO–T–2016–0002] RIN 0651–AD07, Changes in 
Requirements for Affidavits or Declarations of Use, Continued Use, or Excusable Nonuse in Trademark Cases, Feb. 
10, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-10/pdf/2017-02718.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GJT-MCGL]. 
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After five years on the Principal Register without any challenge, trademarks acquire 
certain protections against cancellation proceedings before the PTO.
15
  Furthermore, after a 
registered mark has been in continuous use for five consecutive years after registration, if there’s 
been no “final decision adverse to the owner’s claim of ownership of such mark . . . or to the 
owner’s right to register the same or to keep the same on the register,” and no pending challenge 
to the same, the owner can file an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts.
16
  At that point, the 
owner’s rights to use the registered mark for the goods or services recited in the registration 
“shall be incontestable.”17   
Incontestability is “conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the 
registration of the mark, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s 
exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce.”18  Despite this language, a registrant 
challenging another’s use must always prove likely confusion—the “exclusive rights” are 
exclusive only as to confusing uses, even on the same goods or services.
19
  Moreover, there are 
significant exceptions to the conclusiveness provided by incontestability: challenges on the basis 
of functionality, genericity, and numerous other grounds are still available.
20
  Incontestability’s 
main bite is in preventing any challenge to the registration on the grounds that the mark lacks 
secondary meaning; this can be significant for word marks, but may have even more bite for 
product design trade dress, given that courts demand substantial evidence to prove that the 
design of a product has secondary meaning.
21
   
After incontestability, it does not matter how much proof a challenger offers that the 
symbol at issue is perceived by consumers as merely descriptive of the registrant’s goods or 
services and not as a trademark.
22
  An incontestable registration is conclusive evidence that the 
mark is legally not merely descriptive.
23
  Incontestable marks therefore can’t be invalidated for 
not being real trademarks in the core sense of identifying a specific producer rather than 
                                                 
15
 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2012). These protections are essentially the same as those granted by incontestability, but 
limited to PTO proceedings rather than applicable in judicial actions as well. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. 
18
 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2012). 
19
 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111-12, 114 & 122 (2004). 
20
 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2002). 
21
 See, e.g., Habersham Plantation Corp. v. Art & Frame Direct, Inc., 2011 WL 4005454, at *7 (S.D. Fla. 2011) 
(discussing high burden of proof for showing secondary meaning of trade dress).  
22
 See 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:148 (4th ed.) (2017). 
23
 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b) (2012). 
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describing a product or service, unless they have become generic terms for the category of 
products or services at issue—which is a different inquiry that imposes a far higher burden on the 
challenger than showing mere descriptiveness.
24
  The Supreme Court has made clear that 
incontestability can be used as a sword against competing uses as well as a shield against 
invalidation.
25
  Thus, a registrant may be able to prevent competitors from using a term even if 
the term is useful to describe the goods or services at issue and even if the practical likelihood of 
confusion is negligible.   
As two practitioners explained in 2009, the label “incontestable” can have a powerful 
effect on competitors well before litigation starts, leading potential users to acquiesce to threats 
that may lack legal validity: 
[I]nfringers often are not aware of the infirmities that may attend even an 
incontestable registration. As a result, the biggest benefit from claiming 
incontestability may be in providing the registrant with the ability to say so in a 
cease and desist or other objection letter. Stating that a registration is active, valid, 
in full force and effect and “incontestable” may scare the recipient of the letter 
into giving up on the thought of attacking the registration without ever even 
exploring any of the many grounds for cancellation that survive incontestability.
26
 
The special power of incontestability has been defended as a way to “quiet title” in the 
ownership of a mark.
27
  If no one objects to the registrant’s ownership within five years, then 
perhaps there is no real competitive need to use the term, and so the public loses little if one 
producer has a monopoly on trademark-like use of the term.
28
  This justification has relatively 
                                                 
24
 See, e.g., T. Marzetti Co. v. Roskam Baking Co., 680 F.3d 629, 633-34 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the test for 
genericity is based on the public’s perception of the term as the primary designation for the article and whether the 
term is associated with the product rather than the producer). 
25
 See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196 (1985). 
26
 Sloane & Winston, supra note 13. 
27
 Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198. 
28
 See Jake Linford, Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor: Productive Use and Property Acquisition, 63 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 703, 758 (2013) (“The process for acquiring protection of, and even incontestability for, a 
descriptive mark is consistent with the notice function of productive use because it signals the relative value that the 
mark owner, competitors, and the public place on respective uses of the mark.”); id. at 760 (“If ten or more years 
pass by and no one says anything, the silence itself may be telling…. In order for a descriptive mark to become 
incontestable, … the mark must acquire distinctiveness …. Then, the registration must remain effectively unopposed 
for an additional five years. If the mark owner passes both barriers, she will do so at least in part because neither the 
public nor competitors see enough value in other potential meanings to challenge the mark owner’s claimed 
meaning over an extended period of time.”). 
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little to do with benefiting the public, however; it’s just an argument that incontestability’s costs 
to the public are minimal, while the benefits accrue to businesses that can now be more certain of 
their rights. 
Even on the assumption that quieting title in meaning is a worthy objective, there is a 
problem with incontestability: it is too often claimed even on its own terms, as the next Part will 
show.  That is, too many registrants claim incontestability without satisfying the actual statutory 
requirements, even though those requirements don’t include secondary meaning. We already 
know that there is substantial “deadwood” on the trademark register in the form of marks 
claimed for goods and services, but not, as required by U.S. law, in actual use for those goods 
and services.  When the PTO audited renewal filings—filings by claimants who considered 
maintaining the registration to be worth the cost of paying a maintenance fee—and asked for 
additional specimens showing use on additional claimed goods or services, the average registrant 
responded by instead deleting claimed goods and services.
29
  In a substantial percentage of cases, 
there was no use at all, but the most common situation was that the use was more restricted in 
terms of goods or services than the registrant had represented to the PTO in its renewal filing.
30
  
Given this random sample, we can predict that the Register has many undetected instances of 
over-claiming, potentially deterring legitimate uses and making it more difficult for people to 
figure out the true scope of a registered mark. 
Incontestability filings have not been subjected to similar random audits.  However, 
because there is no substantive examination of such filings, they are vulnerable to similar 
problems with over-claiming, and it’s reasonable to expect similar problems.  Moreover, because 
incontestability has specific legal requirements that may be unfamiliar to lawyers who aren’t 
trademark specialists, it’s simple for negligence alone to produce invalid incontestability filings, 
which then appear on the Register and may distort decision-making, both by competitors and by 
courts.  As the next Section explains, in the last two years, three legally significant cases—
including one that went to the Supreme Court on apparently mistaken premises—were 
complicated by unwarranted Section 15 approvals, and several other cases expressed at best 
limited understanding of incontestability.   
                                                 
29
 See USPTO, Post Registration Proof of Use Pilot Final Report, August 25, 2015, 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Post_Registration_Proof_of_Use_Pilot_Final_Report%20.doc 
[https://perma.cc/43FS-ULYV]. 
30
 Id. at 1. 
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B. Judicial Misreadings of Incontestability 
 Most criticisms of incontestability focus on its potential to prevent challenges to symbols 
that never should have been registered in the first place, because they were never truly 
distinctive.
31
  My argument is different: even assuming that it is legitimate to insulate registered 
marks from descriptiveness challenges, too many courts misunderstand the prerequisites for 
incontestability and thus grant it when they shouldn’t. 
1. Three Examples of Foundational Misunderstandings 
The most striking example of mistaken incontestability comes from B&B v. Hargis.
32
  
This case has a complicated procedural history, and it went to the Supreme Court in 2015 on the 
question of whether preclusion applies to TTAB rulings in subsequent infringement litigation.
33
  
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, at least for some situations.
34
  That result makes 
the stakes of registration higher and reinforces the need to have the Register reflect reality.  
However, the course of the B&B case itself reveals trouble with the accuracy of incontestability 
claims.  B&B registered SEALTIGHT for fasteners in 1993 and then sued Hargis for 
infringement in 1998, relying on its registration.
35
  In 2000, Hargis proved at trial that 
SEALTIGHT was descriptive without secondary meaning for fasteners.
36
  Yet neither the district 
court, nor the court of appeals that affirmed the ruling, ordered the PTO to cancel the 
registration, despite that registration’s invalidity.37  Meanwhile, Hargis filed a petition to cancel 
B&B’s mark, which proceeding was suspended pending the resolution of the infringement 
lawsuit.
38
 
When the infringement lawsuit was resolved in favor of Hargis, Hargis attempted to 
amend its cancellation petition to add the ground of invalidity on the basis of mere 
descriptiveness, but the TTAB denied the motion to amend because by that point B&B’s 
registration was more than five years old, and thus could no longer be challenged in a 
                                                 
31
 See, e.g., Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 207 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lisa 
Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1165-67 (2003). 
32
 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015). 
33
 Id. at 1301. 
34
 Id. at 1310. 
35
 Id. at 1301. 
36
 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 385-86 (8th Cir. 2009). 
37
 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Sealtite Building Fasteners, Opposition No. 91155687 (T.T.A.B. 2007). 
38
 B&B Hardware, 569 F.3d at 385-86. 
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cancellation proceeding on mere descriptiveness grounds.
39
  B&B subsequently renewed its 
registration in 2003 and filed a Section 15 affidavit in 2006, claiming that the requirements for 
incontestability had been satisfied.
40
   
Hargis applied for a registration of its own, which was rejected by the TTAB on grounds 
of likely confusion with B&B’s registered mark.41  After filing for incontestability, B&B sued 
Hargis again in 2006, and the court of appeals found that preclusion from the first trial didn’t 
apply because of the change in the mark’s circumstances from contestable to incontestable.42  
Then, after the Supreme Court decision, the court of appeals found that preclusion from the 
TTAB ruling did apply, meaning that Hargis was an infringer.
43
  B&B filed an affidavit claiming 
that there had been no final decisions adverse to its ownership of the SEALTIGHT mark, after 
losing an infringement case on the ground that it did not own a protectable mark.
44
  Then it 
parlayed that affidavit into a decade of new litigation, including a successful TTAB opposition 
and a duplicate infringement suit, having precluded its opponent’s previously successful 
defense.
45
 
Hargis contributed to the debacle by not seeking an order
46
 cancelling B&B’s trademark 
registration upon its initial victory.
47
  But this too was almost certainly a function of the relative 
                                                 
39
 Sealtite Building Fasteners v. B&B Hardware, Inc., Cancellation No. 92/26016 (T.T.A.B. June 13, 2003) (The 
TTAB would allow tolling, but only “if the plaintiff was unaware of the existence of the basis for the additional 
grounds when the plaintiff filed the petition to cancel, or if the plaintiff was aware of the possibility of additional 
grounds when the plaintiff filed the petition to cancel, but could not, in good faith and pursuant to the requirements 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, plead the additional grounds until a later date.”).   
40
 SEALTITE, Registration No. 1,797,509 (no longer registered), 
https://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=74056236&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=statusSearch 
[https://perma.cc/XLE2-LHX2].  As a reminder, those requirements include that there be no pending challenge to 
the validity of the mark, or successful and final challenge to validity.  
41
 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1297 (2015). 
42
 Id. at 1302. 
43
 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 800 F.3d 427, 427 (8th Cir. 2015). 
44
 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 2009). 
45
 B&B Hardware, 135 S.Ct. at 1301. 
46
 Actually, another order.  Sealtite, a party in privity with Hargis, had initially successfully sought cancellation of 
B&B’s mark, which was granted in 1998, but the cancellation proceeding was suspended in 1999 during the 
pendency of the infringement litigation. Sealtite, Cancellation No. 92/26016 (T.T.A.B. June 13, 2003).   
47
 Hargis did seek to amend its cancellation petition, which had been suspended during the litigation, to add a 
descriptiveness ground for cancellation. The TTAB held that, because Hargis had known of the facts related to the 
descriptiveness issue for a long time, the five-year limitations period for filing a descriptiveness challenge should 
not be tolled by the filing of the initial cancellation petition. Sealtite Building Fasteners v. B&B Hardware, Inc., 
Cancellation No. 92/26016 (T.T.A.B. June 13, 2003).  Because of the conceptual oddity of barring descriptiveness 
challenges—an issue that would ordinarily go to the basic ability of a symbol to function as a mark—and because 
the related benefit of incontestability under Section 15 would clearly be unavailable while a cancellation petition 
was pending no matter what grounds had or hadn’t been asserted, I believe the TTAB’s ruling on this point was an 
 
9 
 
exoticism of registration practice to ordinary trial lawyers, even those who have trademark 
litigation experience: it is not necessarily obvious to non-registration specialists that a final order 
from an Article III court finding a claimed trademark to be merely descriptive needs to be 
followed up by another order from the court directing the PTO to cancel the registration in order 
to have preclusive effect. 
This comedy of errors (or tragedy, from the defendant’s perspective) ended in further 
farce when B&B failed to renew its registration during the pendency of the Supreme Court 
litigation.
48
  As a result, the registration expired.
49
  A jury then found that, while Hargis had 
infringed B&B’s mark during the period it was valid, B&B had committed fraud on the PTO in 
submitting its Section 15 declaration, thus precluding B&B from relying on the incontestability 
of the mark to establish its validity.
50
  The trial court then held that, without the incontestable 
registration, B&B was once again bound by the earlier trial result finding that it had achieved no 
secondary meaning and thus no protectable mark.
51
  All of this could have been stopped much 
earlier if the PTO had possessed sufficient information to see that the statutory requirements for 
incontestability had not been met and had engaged in substantive examination of the affidavit, or 
if the courts had understood the statutory requirements and independently examined whether 
they’d been satisfied. 
The second case in my trilogy had a less impressive judicial trajectory but an equally if 
not more complicated backstory.  Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo 
S.A. De C.V., a recent case from the District Court for the District of Columbia, considered many 
                                                                                                                                                             
error related to the problems discussed in the main text.  Had Hargis been allowed to amend its pending cancellation 
petition to add the ground that the claimed mark was no trademark at all, as a final ruling from an Article III court 
established, many administrative and judicial resources could have been saved—and the register would have more 
clearly reflected marketplace reality. 
48
 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 2016 WL 3615833, No. 4:06CV01654 BSM, (E.D. Ark., May 16, 
2016). 
49
 Id. at *4. 
50
 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., No. 4:06CV01654 BSM (E.D. Ark. Jun. 26, 2016), slip op. at 1. 
While the jury verdict form asked one relevant question, whether Hargis had proven fraud in procuring the 
registration and/or the incontestability, the court later clarified that Hargis’ theory was fraud in procuring 
incontestability, as described in text.  B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., No. 4:06CV01654 BSM (E.D. 
Ark. Feb. 17, 2017), slip op. at 5 (“Hargis’s position at trial was that Larry Bogatz, B&B’s president, misled the 
PTO – and thus committed fraud – by signing a declaration in support of his incontestability petition. That 
declaration required Bogatz to declare that B&B had not received a final decision on the merits adverse to its claim 
of ownership of the trademark that affected its right to register that mark. Of course, B&B cannot reasonably dispute 
that Bogatz’s declaration was false: the 2000 jury verdict found B&B’s mark to be merely descriptive and devoid of 
secondary meaning which, under the law, means the mark could not be registered.”) (citation omitted). 
51
 Id. at 3. 
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interrelated issues about famous foreign marks, concurrent use, and territoriality.
52
  The case 
involved LA MICHOACANA, a term found by the court to be descriptive for an ice cream 
specialty associated with a Mexican region.
53
  Because descriptive terms are only protectable 
once they have secondary meaning, the question became whether either the plaintiff or the 
defendant had attained secondary meaning in the U.S. in such a way as to give it priority over the 
other.
54
   
The PTO accepted Section 15 affidavits for certain registered marks using LA 
MICHOACANA during the pendency of the litigation.
55
  The court, lacking detailed knowledge 
of the registration process, did not recognize that a Section 15 affidavit is inherently invalid if 
filed during a pending challenge to the validity of the mark.
56
  Thus, the court treated the affected 
marks as if they were incontestable, ending the secondary meaning inquiry and giving one party 
a nationwide priority date established by law.
57
  Had the court allowed the secondary meaning 
dispute to continue, the other party might have been able to establish its priority.  Instead, the 
priority date for the “incontestable” marks proved dispositive of the infringement claims.58  
Although the unsuccessful party eventually figured out the problem and pointed out that the 
incontestability could not possibly be valid, given that the claimant had participated in a 
teleconference about the case challenging the validity of its marks on the very day it filed the 
affidavit stating that there were no pending challenges to its marks, the court held that this 
argument had been waived because it had been raised too late.
59
 
Showing the variety of ways in which incontestability can go wrong, the third case, Nola 
Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel Enterprises Inc.,
60
 involved a similar error with a slightly better 
outcome, though possibly just by chance.  The registrant claimed rights in an image of a Mardi 
                                                 
52
 Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteso Tocumbo, No. 11-1623 (RC), 2016 WL 3034150 (D.D.C. 
May 27, 2016). 
53
 Id. at *99. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. at *48, *66. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. at *107. 
59
 Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteso Tocumbo, No. 11-1623 (RC), 2017 WL 1194331 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 30, 2017). 
60
 Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v Haydel Enterprises, Inc., 783 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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Gras bead dog for jewelry—a Mardi Gras bead dog is a trinket made by twisting Mardi Gras 
beads into a shape that resembles a dog
61
: 
 
 
The trial court found that Mardi Gras bead dogs were merely descriptive for Mardi Gras-
related merchandise, including jewelry.
62
  Because the plaintiff couldn’t show secondary 
meaning, its registration was invalid.
63
  During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff filed a 
Section 15 affidavit, which was duly accepted by the PTO despite the clear indication in the 
PTO’s own records that there was a pending challenge to the validity of the mark—a reminder 
that acceptance of such affidavits is not substantive examination.
64
 
The Section 15 affidavit should never have been filed; it was never valid.  The filing 
attorney may not even have known about the pending litigation.  Most likely, this was not 
deliberate fraud on the PTO; instead, somewhere between attorney and client, knowledge of the 
relevant facts, or understanding of the legal implications of the relevant facts, slipped between 
the cracks.
65
  Had the Section 15 affidavit been legally effective—or had the court of appeals 
                                                 
61
 Id. at 534, 554. 
62
 Id. at 538. 
63
 Id. 
64
 See Letter from U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to John W. Hazard Jr. (Feb. 14, 2015), 
https://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn77477990&docId=OOA20150414131947#docIndex=0&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/8S3G-DPX6]. 
65
 The attorney of record for the registration was not one of the attorneys of record in the relevant litigation. Cf. 
Constellation Brands, Inc., v. Arbor Hill Associates, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (the lawyer 
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misunderstood it as such, as in the Paleteria la Michoacana case—the plaintiff could have 
reversed the district court’s finding despite its legal correctness when made.  When the error was 
brought to the PTO’s attention by my blog post on the matter, the PTO rescinded the acceptance 
on its own initiative.
66
  (Nonetheless, and despite the 2013 order by the court cancelling the 
trademark registration, which was duly submitted to the PTO
67
 and which became final in 
2015,
68
 the registration still appeared as live in the PTO’s database when I searched on March 
13, 2017.)  However, no procedure is in place to prevent this from happening again, and, as in 
B&B and Paleteria la Michoacana, most businesses faced with a trademark threat won’t 
understand the details of registration and Section 15 affidavits.
69
   
General unfamiliarity with incontestability probably explains why many parties who 
would benefit from pointing out erroneous incontestability designations fail to do so.  The three 
cases I have detailed are examples that turned up in my research fortuitously; they were not 
produced from any attempt to determine how often problems with Section 15 affidavits occur.  
Moreover, each case appears to involve courts that didn’t pay detailed attention to, and were 
almost certainly unfamiliar with, the legal prerequisites for incontestability.
70
 If a Section 15 
affidavit is incorrect (whether or not knowingly false), then the requirements of Section 15 
haven’t been met, and thus courts should not accord the affected registration an irrebutable 
presumption of distinctiveness.  But it is a disturbing fact that the error has been repeated 
                                                                                                                                                             
who filed the Section 15 affidavit did not participate in, and was unaware of, pending litigation that made the 
affidavit invalid). 
66
 See Letter from U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to John W. Hazard Jr. (Feb. 14, 2015), 
https://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn77477990&docId=OOA20150414131947#docIndex=0&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/8S3G-DPX6] (stating that the acceptance of the affidavit was rescinded and that the affidavit could 
not be acknowledged because “Office records show the subject registered mark is involved in a court proceeding 
that is not yet final”). 
67
 See Nola Spice Designs LLC, Form AO 120, No. 12-2515 “J” (2) (Oct. 16, 2012) available at 
https://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn77477990&docId=NOS20131023115937#docIndex=4&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/R6M9-47MW]. 
68
 After remand, the case was dismissed with prejudice on May 20, 2015.  Order, Nola Spice Designs L.L.C. v. 
Haydel Enters., Inc., No. 12-cv-02515 (E.D. La., filed May 21, 2015). 
69
 See Constellation Brands, Inc., v. Arbor Hill Associates, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 347, 355 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(involving a similar fact pattern in which a Section 15 affidavit was filed during pendency of dispute).  Constellation 
is an example of a case in which the defendant caught the problem, but then engaged in likely expensive litigation 
over whether the affiant’s arguably gross negligence amounted to fraud on the PTO. 
70
 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015).  The Court of Appeals should not 
have found that the earlier jury verdict lacked preclusive effect.  The statutory prerequisites for Section 15 
incontestability simply had not been satisfied, and thus there should have been no legally relevant change in 
circumstances. See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2010). 
13 
 
multiple times by different courts in case-dispositive ways, including in a case that made it all 
the way to the Supreme Court and through two trials.   
2. Other Recent Examples of Misunderstandings 
Courts occasionally disagree about the legal meaning of incontestability, as well.  In 
particular, they treat incontestability as having inconsistent effects on the strength of a mark for 
purposes of the infringement inquiry.
71
  Part of the problem seems to be a judicial game of 
telephone, where one court slightly adjusts another’s reasoning and changes it from correct or 
arguable to flat-out wrong.  For example, in 2016 a Connecticut district court stated that “[a]n 
incontestable, registered trademark enjoys a presumption of inherent distinctiveness.”72  This 
conclusion is incoherent under our current system, given that incontestability is fundamentally 
about ensuring that descriptive terms are protectable as if they had secondary meaning.  
Descriptive marks are never inherently distinctive or conceptually strong; they depend on 
acquired distinctiveness, or the presumption thereof, for their protectability.  If one wanted to 
presume strength from incontestability, one would have to turn to a presumption of marketplace 
strength or a separate concept of “strength as a matter of law,” not conceptual strength.73  The 
Connecticut district court cited a case about the presumption of distinctiveness conferred by 
incontestable registrations and simply added in a reference to “inherent” distinctiveness.74  Its 
conflation of related but distinct concepts was not unique.  Because courts have no consistent 
understanding of the meaning of registration in infringement inquiries,
75
 it is not surprising that 
they compound their errors in incontestability situations. 
                                                 
71
 See Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. 867, 902-04 (2017). 
72
 Edible Arrangments, LLC v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 2016 WL 4074121, at *6 (D. Conn. 2016). 
73
 The circuit that has endorsed this minority position on incontestability’s relationship to strength of the mark has 
recently expressed discomfort with it. Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John v. Florida Priory of the 
Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Order of Saint John, 809 F.3d 1171, 1183 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The law in this 
Circuit is almost certainly incorrect. The incontestability of a mark, by itself, says nothing about its strength.”); cf. 
Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 632 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Even where a trademark is 
incontestable . . . the significance of its presumed strength will depend upon its recognition among members of the 
public.”). 
74
 See Edible Arrangements, 2016 WL 4074121, at *6 (citing Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 457 (2d Cir. 
2004)). 
75
 See Tushnet, supra note 7171, at 900-02.  Courts have even treated incontestability as a status that avoids any 
need to prove confusion if the defendant’s use is for the same goods or services, despite the Supreme Court’s clear 
holding to the contrary in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).  See 
Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Industries, LP, 616 F.3d 722, 724 (7
th
 Cir. 2010) (“Clarin’s customers buy in 
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To take another recent example, Kibler v. Hall,
76
 which according to one commentator 
might be the new leading decision in the Sixth Circuit,
77
 evidenced the same kind of confusion 
over the relationship between incontestability and strength.  Kibler (known professionally as DJ 
Logic) sued a rapper (known professionally as Logic) for infringement and dilution.  Kibler 
registered “DJ LOGIC” as a trademark for his services in 2000, allowed the registration to lapse 
in 2007,
78
 and re-registered the name in 2013.
79
 The Sixth Circuit, in explaining the standards for 
judging the strength of a mark, stated that conceptual strength requires inherent distinctiveness 
and that courts presume that incontestable marks are conceptually strong.
80
  Kibler argued that 
the district court had erred in not considering his mark’s incontestability.81  Rather than adopting 
defendants’ correct points that the expired registration had no legal significance whatsoever, and 
that the new registration was only three years old, the court of appeals ignored the opportunity to 
clarify the requirements for incontestability. Instead, the court of appeals reasoned that the 
district court’s finding that the mark was suggestive and therefore inherently distinctive “renders 
‘DJ LOGIC’ at least as conceptually strong as a finding of incontestability would.”82  This 
confusion about whether incontestability even existed is of a piece with the court’s lack of clarity 
on what relationship incontestability could plausibly have to a mark’s strength.   
Other courts treat incontestability as a concept subject to very little judicial scrutiny.  In a 
long-running case in the Northern District of California, for example, a court recently rejected a 
challenge to incontestability that should have succeeded.
83
  The relevant declaration failed to 
identify the proper owner of the trademark, and it is quite clear that compliance with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
bulk and are sophisticated; it is exceedingly unlikely that any of them is confused about who makes which chair. 
Because the mark is incontestable, however, the absence of confusion does not matter.”). 
76
 Kibler v. Hall, 843 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 2016). 
77
 See Rick Sanders(@RickSandersLaw), TWITTER (Dec. 15, 2016, 3:43 PM), 
https://twitter.com/RickSandersLaw/status/809499202086694912 [https://perma.cc/TTG2-4DXQ]. 
78
 Erroneously reported as 2003 in the opinion.  See Defendant-Appellee UMG Recordings, Inc., dba Def Jam 
Recordings’ Appeal Brief in Opposition at 18, Kibler v. Hall, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22079 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016) 
(No. 15-2516) (“Kibler’s only active registration issued on July 23, 2013 and thus had not even reached the five-
year period upon which incontestability status is available. . . . Kibler’s claim that he owns incontestable rights 
based on a prior registration — which was cancelled in 2007 when Kibler failed to file a simple declaration and fee 
— is contrary to the express language of the statute.”). 
79
 Kibler, 843 F.3d at 1073.  
80
 Id.; see also Makers Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 420 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(“[C]onceptual strength is bolstered by the mark’s status as ‘incontestable.’”). 
81
 Kibler, 843 F.3d at 1074. 
82
 Id. 
83
 United Tactical Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., No. 14-cv-04050, 2017 WL 713135 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 
2017).   
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statutory requirements, including the identification of the proper owner, is mandatory.  Though 
the court recognized this requirement, it quixotically also held that, because the PTO accepted 
the declaration, the trademark was conclusively presumed valid subject only to the statutory 
defenses to incontestable marks.
84
  The court even noted that there was no reason to think that 
the PTO knew about the ownership problem, given that the PTO’s records would have matched 
the owner listed in the declaration.
85
 Instead of deciding the issue itself, the court suggested that 
it was the PTO’s job to figure out the appropriate remedy for anyone who wanted to challenge 
the incontestability.
86
 The court was apparently unaware that the PTO has already stated that it 
only acknowledges receipt of an affidavit of incontestability and does not in fact determine 
whether the registration is incontestable, considering that a matter for the court in any subsequent 
judicial proceeding.
87
  
It is also possible to find clear-eyed judicial evaluations of incontestability, for example 
from the Fourth Circuit in 1990: 
 
[C]ontrary to the claims made in his affidavit of use filed with the Patent and Trademark 
Office, Brittingham did not use the THRASHER’S mark continuously in connection with 
the sale of goods for the required five-year period following registration. Consequently, 
incontestability never attached to Brittingham’s trademark registration. The Lanham Act 
contains no exceptions to the five-year continuous use requirement for incontestability, 
and we have discovered none in the published cases. Accordingly, Brittingham’s 
registration entitles him only to a rebuttable presumption of ownership ….88 
 
                                                 
84
 Id. at *15. 
85
 Id. at *15 n.10. 
86
 Id. at *15 n.11; cf. Advanced Transit Dynamics, Inc. v. Ridge Corp., No. CV 15-01877, 2016 WL 6804918, at *5 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016) (stating that the USPTO “concluded” that plaintiff’s mark was incontestable; also stating 
erroneously that incontestability precluded challenge on grounds of genericness). 
87
 TMEP § 1605 (8
th
 ed. Jan. 2017). 
88
 Brittingham v. Jenkins, 914 F.2d 447, 454–55 (4th Cir. 1990) (footnotes omitted).  See also Plant Food Systems, 
Inc. v. AgroSource, Inc., 2016 WL 5921674, at *18 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (recognizing that continuous use has to be 
shown for incontestability and finding that it wasn’t despite plaintiff’s allegations that mark had become 
incontestable). 
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Still, it’s disturbing that so many recent cases seem confused about what incontestability 
is, and fail to examine whether the statutory prerequisites were satisfied.  We could use a few 
more current cases dealing with the issue as explicitly as the Fourth Circuit did.
89
 
 
II. Partial Solutions: Building on Existing Reforms 
The PTO cannot, of course, prevent all errors, but its public pronouncements may educate 
lawyers and courts.  For example, changes to the process for Section 15 affidavits, similar to 
those already underway for Section 8 renewal filings, could help registrants avoid the kinds of 
inadvertent errors that may well have underlain these cases.  While a mark that has become 
incontestable cannot be challenged on the ground that it lacks secondary meaning, it should be 
possible for challengers to identify marks that never satisfied the statutory prerequisites for 
incontestability.  Specifically, possessing secondary meaning isn’t itself a prerequisite for 
incontestability.
90
  But five years of continuous use, as well as lack of a pending challenge or 
final successful challenge to validity are.
91
  A mark that was in fact subject to such a successful 
or pending challenge, therefore, has not satisfied the statute and is not entitled to the cloak of 
incontestability. 
Incontestability is, in its essence, a matter to be evaluated by a court.  The PTO has been 
quite explicit that it does not engage in substantive examination of a Section 15 affidavit, and 
that it will not evaluate whether the substantive requirements have been satisfied.  Its inquiry is 
limited to whether the registrant’s affidavit includes the proper identifying information.92  If this 
explanation appeared as mandatory language in the Section 15 affidavit, which is often entered 
into evidence when a claimant asserts the benefit of incontestability, more courts might be 
informed of their important role in the process.   
Perhaps incontestability’s existence as a legal fiction—this is a trademark, no matter what 
consumers actually see when they look at it—has contributed to courts’ unwillingness to 
                                                 
89
 By way of comparison, NetJets Inc. v. IntelliJet Gp., LLC, No. 15-4230 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 2017), rejected a claim 
that an incontestable registration could be challenged based on non-use at the time of the original registration, but 
remanded for determination of whether the mark in suit was actually incontestable.  The remand suggests that the 
court recognized that failure to satisfy the requirement of five years of continuous use would prevent incontestability 
regardless of the presence of the affidavit in the PTO’s records, but the court missed an opportunity to be 
unmistakably clear about this. 
90
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2010). 
91
 Id. 
92
 TMEP § 1605 (8
th
 ed. Jan. 2017). 
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examine its prerequisites.  If incontestability is just a form of magical thinking, then logic 
wouldn’t necessarily play much of a role in its acquisition.  But, if anything, the oddness of 
incontestability should encourage courts to be careful about when they find that it exists.  
Because whether the statutory requirements have been satisfied depends on the existence of 
successful or pending challenges to the mark’s validity, this will be a self-contained inquiry, and 
getting it right in the first place could save a lot of trouble later, as the cases discussed in Part I 
show. 
Despite the occasional judicial misunderstanding of this point, courts are not precluded 
by the statute from asking the relevant questions about incontestability.
93
  Federal Treasury 
Enterprise Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Intern. N.V. (FTE), a Second Circuit case from 2010, 
made clear that incontestability “on the books” does not prevent courts from asking whether a 
claimant is in fact entitled to its benefit
 
.
94
  In FTE, plaintiff FTE claimed rights to various 
STOLICHNAYA trademarks for vodka and sued defendants SPI and Allied Domecq, arguing 
among other things that SPI had not successfully assigned its purported rights to Allied 
Domecq.
95
  The district court concluded that because the marks had become incontestable when 
owned by SPI and because the Lanham Act doesn’t list invalid assignment as a defense to 
incontestability, FTE could not challenge the validity of their assignment to Allied Domecq.
96
 
The court of appeals reversed.
97
  The validity of the assignment was a separate issue that 
had to be resolved before the court could determine whether Allied Domecq was entitled to the 
benefit of incontestability.
98
  The analogy is not exact, but the basic principle—incontestability is 
for marks that have satisfied all the requirements thereof, not just for marks that happen to have a 
Section 15 affidavit on file—should be the same.  As the FTE court commented, it would be a 
“perverse result” if the use of “recording—a ministerial act— [was transformed] into a 
mechanism for conclusively defeating allegations . . . challenging the legality of the 
assignment.”99  So too with the ministerial act of accepting a Section 15 affidavit or counting the 
years a registration has been on the record. 
                                                 
93
 See Brittingham, 914 F.2d at 454–55. 
94
 Federal Treasury Enterprise Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Intern. N.V., 623 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 2010). 
95
 Id. at 62-63. 
96
 Id. at 63. 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. 
99
 Id. at 68. 
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As noted in the introduction, the PTO has discovered significant over-claiming through 
random audits of renewal filings.
100
  Although incontestability is rarer than mere renewal, the 
cost to the public of a single faulty incontestability designation may be higher than the cost of a 
single extra goods or services designation, given the ability of a registrant to use incontestability 
as leverage in disputes and the ongoing confusion in the courts about the effect of 
incontestability on a mark’s strength. 
Small steps could prevent many of these mistakes in the first place.  The PTO has made 
changes to the standard declaration that an applicant signs under penalty of perjury when filing a 
trademark application.
101
  Instead of a traditional block of text, the form now presents a separate 
series of clauses with check boxes next to each statement.
102
  The applicant should now more 
readily understand that it must claim use, or intent to use, the mark on every good or service it 
lists in the application. Further, applicants will need to verify that statements made in the 
application have evidentiary support.
103
   
Similar measures could improve incontestability by making the requirements of Section 
15 more salient.  For example, the affiant could be required to check a box, yes or no, about 
whether there are any pending or resolved cases involving the mark.
104
  If the answer is yes, the 
form could ask the affiant to provide more information and explain whether there is any 
(1) pending or (2) successful and final challenge to the validity or ownership of the mark.  
Alternatively, the affiant could be required to list all proceedings, pending and terminated, 
involving any challenge to the validity or ownership of the mark in question, and state the status 
or outcome of the proceeding with respect to the mark.
105
  Since most registered trademarks are 
                                                 
100
 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
101
 See Carl Oppedahl, USPTO tackling the “balaclava problem” (part 1), (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://blog.oppedahl.com/?p=1951. 
102
 Id. 
103
 Id. 
104
 Affiants might be asked separately to check a box about whether there is any notice of pending or resolved cases 
that appears in the PTO’s TSDR database, in order to deal with the sadly not uncommon situation in which 
registration counsel is not litigation counsel and may not be aware of pending litigation.  Signing the affidavit 
without further inquiry in this circumstance is at least negligent, but clear notice of the required steps may increase 
the care taken by registration counsel. 
105
 Many run-of-the-mill infringement cases don’t involve challenges to validity or ownership. The facts about the 
cases should be easy for the trademark registrant to verify, given that the Section 15 affidavit need be filed only once 
in the registration’s history.  
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never involved in litigation,
106
 the burden on registrants would be minimal.  Moreover, given the 
PTO’s resource constraints and the lack of any procedure in place for substantive examination of 
Section 15 affidavits, requiring affiants to provide more information is a useful step towards 
ensuring that the register reflects reality.  Random audits of trademarks for which the PTO has 
received a “Notice of Suit Incoming” could also improve the situation, assisting the PTO and 
registrants in determining when the register needs to be updated to reflect reality. 
The legal heft behind the PTO’s current changes is not as great as it might be because the 
federal courts have made it extraordinarily difficult to prove fraud on the PTO, even when the 
registrant’s misstatement relates to matters peculiarly within its own knowledge.107  Thus, there 
remains little chance of a penalty for misstatements about use—without fraud, the registrant can 
keep its priority date for any goods or services for which there was actual use.  Troubles with 
incontestability provide examples of why the Federal Circuit should rethink its approach to fraud 
in the trademark context.  In the alternative, legislation could make it easier to show underlying 
invalidity based on misstatements to the PTO, even if we don’t want to tar the misstatements 
with the label “fraud.” Even without changes in judicial interpretation or statutory amendment, 
however, the PTO’s current reforms should lead to more attention to actual use, and diminish the 
number of overstatements that are the result of mere negligence.  Similar changes could improve 
incontestability filings as well. 
Likewise, institutionalizing random audits of trademark maintenance filings will help 
police overstatements in renewals.
108
  There are also meritorious proposals to create an expedited 
non-use proceeding whenever a challenger has a good reason to believe that the use recited in a 
registration is not in fact taking place.
109
  The audit procedure could be expanded to a percentage 
of Section 15 affidavits, at least to the extent of having examiners run a Westlaw search and 
check whether any pending cases appear in TSDR and then, if the trademark appears to be the 
                                                 
106
 There are several million active registrations and only slightly over 28,000 trademark cases terminated in the 
period January 2009-March 2016.  LEX MACHINA TRADEMARK LITIGATION REPORT 2016, fig. 15. 
107
 See, e.g., Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John v. Florida Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of the 
Sovereign Order of Saint John, 809 F.3d 1171, 1183 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The party seeking cancellation on the basis 
of fraud must prove its claim by clear and convincing evidence.”); In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“Subjective intent to deceive, however difficult it may be to prove, is an indispensable element in the 
analysis.”). 
108
 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
109
 Mark Jansen & Paul Famiglietti, Purging Deadwood at the Trademark Register: Three Possible Mechanisms, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BULLETIN (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.fenwick.com/Publications/Pages/Intellectual-
Property-Bulletin-Fall-2016.aspx [https://perma.cc/22TY-BBT9]. 
20 
 
subject of litigation, asking the trademark owner to explain why the cases aren’t relevant.  The 
PTO could also consider a similar procedure for verifying incontestability if a question arises, 
making a more formal practice of the correction it made in Nola Spice.
110
   
B&B’s fraud on the PTO aside, there’s no reason to think that most registrants who 
provide incorrect information are determined to distort the register.  Negligence and ignorance 
are, as far as I can tell, bigger problems.  It is therefore worth giving more detailed cues about the 
statutory requirements for a Section 15 affidavit to affiants at the moment those cues are most 
needed.  Some people may object to increased attention to the statutory requirements for 
incontestability.  But such changes are useful steps to improving the quality of the register, 
removing deadwood and confirming the continued existence of properly registered marks.  
While penalties such as cancellation of the entire registration might be appropriate for fraud, 
correction of the register to reflect reality, such as the reality of nonuse or lack of 
incontestability, is not a penalty.  And the minimal increased burden on trademark claimants to 
confirm the facts is justified given the enormous benefits federal registration provides to such 
claimants and the additional benefits of incontestability.  These benefits are worth the effort of 
confirming the accuracy of claims with someone in a position to know the truth.  
Thinking slightly bigger, statutory reforms might well be justified.  For example, 
currently no filing is required for registrations to receive the benefits of incontestability in a 
cancellation procedure, as long as they have been registered for more than five years.
111
  But the 
renewal and incontestability filings are one of the few chances we have to make registrants think 
about what they are really claiming.  Why not consider requiring a filing in order to confer 
incontestability’s protections in PTO proceedings, as well as in court? 
Trademark attorneys can improve their procedures as well.  Registration counsel is 
sometimes, but not always, litigation counsel.  When lawyers discuss renewals and Section 15 
affidavits with their clients, they should take care to ask about whether there is any pending 
litigation or PTO proceeding involving the mark, not just whether the client is still using the 
mark and wants the registration renewed. 
The courts also have a role to play beyond restoring a real understanding of 
incontestability’s legal requirements.  Under current rules, notices should be sent to the PTO 
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about pending cases involving registered trademarks.
112
  In theory, the plaintiff should file the 
relevant form with its complaint, and the clerk’s office should pass the form on to the PTO.  
These forms are then recorded by the PTO and become part of the formal record for the 
registration at issue.  The form should be filed again, with appropriate updates indicating the 
outcome, when the case is terminated. 
If a mark’s record is complete, then it will be a simple matter to identify whether further 
inquiry is required to evaluate whether the requirements for incontestability have been met.  
Although the notification process is already in place, experience indicates that compliance is 
spotty.  I have not randomly sampled the records, but anecdotal experience indicates that many 
litigated cases involving registered marks never show up in the registration record.  For example, 
the highly significant case Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, 
Inc.,
113
 which involved a partial cancellation of Louboutin’s red sole mark for its shoes, never 
showed up in the PTO’s records until after the court of appeals had ordered the partial 
cancellation; there is no record of the proper form being filed in the district court as it should 
have been.
114
  If litigators and clerks’ offices around the country became more aware of the 
problem, the records could be improved. 
III. Conclusion 
Incontestability is undertheorized and underexplored.  It could be part of a functioning 
system of treating registration as conferring substantive rights—strengthening marks as a matter 
of law.
115
 But if it is to do so, then ensuring that incontestability is only claimed when there is a 
real justification for it is vital. 
We could, of course, also eliminate incontestability and avoid all these problems.  Some 
people may reasonably read my account of incontestability’s implementation difficulties as 
further evidence that the concept is too alien to American use-based trademark law to function 
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well.
116
  I remain agnostic on this point—I see the appeal of the “quiet title” argument, at least as 
long as the standards for granting registrations in the first instance are carefully enforced.  If the 
PTO is careful about ensuring that descriptive terms and product designs can only be registered 
when they truly have secondary meaning, then an additional five years of unchallenged use post-
registration might be a reasonable proxy for continuing distinctiveness.  If registrations are 
granted too easily, on the other hand, then incontestability will also be granted too easily.  But 
getting rid of incontestability wouldn’t help the underlying problem of poor screening at the 
registration phase, and if we took both registration and incontestability more seriously we would 
be better off overall. 
Fundamentally, no one should be made better off by providing inaccurate information to 
the PTO.  Unfortunately, it is currently possible to benefit from doing so. The PTO’s changes to 
its practices for registration and renewal are positive steps towards making it less likely that 
affiants will inadvertently misrepresent the facts.  Incontestability also offers low-hanging fruit 
for improving the accuracy of the trademark register and the courts’ understanding of what 
registration means. 
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